Greg+Silva+-+Week+1

Terry Halwes, in his series of essays regarding the nature of scientific study and truth, argues that one of the fundamental problems with attempting to systematically assess the unique value of scientific knowledge is the lack of research in the nature of how people learn. Despite the amount of faith that we put into science, “We don't even really understand how babies learn to walk, much less how they learn to talk and to solve problems. We are just beginning to really understand how anybody learns anything, communicates with anyone else about anything, or accomplishes any sort of accurate reasoning” (Halwes). In order to evaluate how scientific knowledge is acquired, we need to further observe how humans learn knowledge in general.

Terry Halwes further argues, and I agree to an extent, that a “magical myth of science” (Halwes) exists that can be described in three parts, “(1) Scientific Knowledge is a new type of knowledge, superior to common sense and all other types of non-scientific beliefs. (2) Scientific Knowledge can only be discovered by highly trained professional scientists. (3) Scientists obtain Scientific Knowledge by following The Scientific Method, a uniquely powerful tool for understanding Reality” (Halwes). That scientific knowledge is, on its own, superior to any other form of knowledge is at best a poor claim. While knowledge acquired through scientific study can often yield interesting or practical results, knowledge gained through means other than scientific pursuit, such as common sense, can yield equally useful information to the point that “when a new science emerges out of the background of common-sense belief and practical detail in a particular area, the scientists do not begin by re-examining all that background knowledge to make sure it comes up to some scientific standard of quality and reliability. They take for granted these generally respected beliefs and methods as they focus on whatever it is that they are interested in” (Halwes). Very often, information learned outside the scope of science can be more useful, and sometimes lead to, an explosion of scientific inquiry. In this sense, I also agree with Halwes’s criticism of the second part of the so-called myth of science, that only scientists can gain scientific knowledge.

I also agree with Hawles’s criticism of the hypothetical-deductive scientific method, especially the argument that much of our scientific knowledge does not originate in creating and testing hypotheses, but rather originates from observation, particularly of surprising events that scientific understanding at the time can not explain – “When something surprising happens, we learn from it. Animals and children do too. We might stare at it, pupils dilated, and make excited noises: "Did you see that?!”” (Halwes). A modification of the scientific method that incorporates the creation of a base level of knowledge from observation in a particular field would provide a much more useful model of how we learn scientific material – especially in fields largely defined by observation and classification by pattern, rather than deductive reasoning. The scientific method also needs to account for advances in logic and reasoning (i.e. Newton’s application of calculus to physics) and how they can lead to a stronger understanding of how things work.

However, Hawles’s interpretation of truth of absolute is flawed – absolute, concrete truth, by its very nature, can only exist if it is defined to be true. Anything that is not a logical creation of humanity (i.e. mathematics, computational logic) can not possibly be absolutely true. Observed phenomena can only be considered true for the person/people who observe it – after all, who is to say that this particular person/group reliably observed the phenomena that he/they claimed to observe aside from the observer himself? On that note, the next strongest classification from absolute truth, which must, by its nature, be defined by human logic first, is observed truth. If people can consistently and reliably observe something, that observation is as true as possible without being a defined truth. These presumably true observations can be used to deduce further predictions about how the object works or behaves. These deductions, which scientists seek, can readily change – for instance, when Pluto was discovered, it was classified as a planet (apparently I was among the last to learn the 9-planet system) and studied as such. However, as more objects similar to Pluto were discovered by advanced detection systems, scientists changed Pluto’s classification, removing it from the ranks of the planets in the solar system.

Long story short - the truth that scientists seek is not absolute and may be modified as advances in measurement, logic, or observational data deem necessary.